The role of the ECB in financial assistance programmes by Sibert, Anne
  
 
 
 
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES 
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role of the ECB in Financial 
Assistance Programmes 
 
 
 
 
NOTE 
 
 
 
Abstract 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 In a better world, an organization as independent and as lacking in accountability as 
the ECB would play no role in providing a significant amount of funds for financial 
assistance programmes for sovereigns such as the three active Troika programmes or 
for programmes for banks.  
 In a world where leaders lack the political will to resolve the sovereign and banking 
crises, the ECB may have a role to play as it is the only entity capable of mobilising 
substantial revenue with sufficient speed. It is better to have the ECB in its current 
form take on the quasi-fiscal role of lender-of-last-resort than to suffer widespread 
financial ruin.  
 Well-designed central banks (as opposed to the ECB) do and should act as market 
makers and lenders of last resort even though it is hard to ascertain whether or not 
the illiquidity is temporary and as a consequence they must take on risk on behalf of 
society. Such central banks should, if necessary, make a market for sovereign as well 
as bank debt if this market is dysfunctional and they should stand ready to provide 
liquidity to a solvent but illiquid sovereign as well as to a solvent but illiquid bank. 
 The issuance of fiat money is an extremely profitable monopoly and the Eurosystem 
can collect a sizable amount of seigniorage revenue while maintaining inflation of two 
percent. A back-of-the envelope calculation puts yearly seigniorage collection at 
EUR 40 billion. Buiter and Rahbari (2011) estimate that the Eurosystem can collect 
seigniorage revenue with a present discounted value of about three trillion euros. 
 A straightforward way that the ECB can use its seigniorage to support illiquid but 
potentially solvent sovereigns is to buy their debt outright in secondary markets as it 
has done in the Securities Markets Programme. However this is less efficient than 
purchasing their debt in primary issuer markets and includes no conditionality that 
would promote good fiscal behaviour. 
 The recent LTROs are a second method for funding illiquid sovereigns. Banks are used 
as intermediaries so as effectively to allow indirect purchases of sovereign debt in 
primary markets. This is done by having the ECB makes long-term loans to banks at 
subsidized interest rates. Financial repression in periphery countries then ensures that 
the banks use at least some of the money to purchase their sovereign’s debt in the 
primary issue market. But, this is also inefficient as only some of the money loaned is 
used to purchase debt and this method too includes no conditionality. 
 A third method for assisting illiquid sovereigns would be to use the IMF as an 
intermediary. The National Central Banks (NCBs) of the Eurosystem would make loans 
to the IMF and the IMF would makes loans to the sovereigns at low interest rates 
reflecting its preferred creditor status. These loans would have the benefit of 
conditionality but political leaders might not be sufficiently discerning to restrict 
funding to potentially solvent borrowers and the method might be viewed as a 
violation of the Treaty. 
 A fourth method is similar to the third but uses the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) as intermediary. The ESM is given a banking license and borrows from the 
NCBs, using the loans it later makes to sovereigns as collateral. This has the problems 
of the third method but might be an improvement in that the ESM is a European 
institution. As such the conditions might be more flexible and this method avoids the 
spectacle of the euro area having to beg emerging markets for funding through the 
IMF. 
 A lack of political will might mean that the IMF is the only entity capable of 
recapitalizing systemically important banks and adequately insuring periphery bank 
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deposits with sufficient haste. Using the ECB would be a case of the end justifying the 
politically unfortunate means. 
PE 475.116 5 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In a more perfect world, the ECB would not play a role in providing a significant amount of 
funds in financial assistance programmes for sovereigns such as the three active Troika 
programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, or for programmes for banks, such as the 
one recently announced for Spain. ECB policy makers are unelected and the institution 
enjoys a possibly unprecedented level of independence for a central bank. It has virtually 
no formal accountability and has disdained substantive accountability. A significant fiscal 
role for such a body is not palatable in a democracy. Taking on such a role threatens not 
only the legitimacy of the Eurosystem, but as the Eurosystem is one of the key governance 
institutions of the European Union, a loss of its legitimacy endangers the legitimacy of all 
other European Union governance institutions, including the European Commission, 
the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. 
Also in a more perfect world the ECB’s advice would undoubtedly have been sought as it 
would have been seen not just as an expert in the realm of macroeconomics but also as a 
leading source of expertise in the area of financial stability, money markets and capital 
markets. However, when it comes to providing funding to banks and sovereigns within the 
context of financial assistance programmes to such entitites, the ECB would have been 
designed differently or it would act strictly as the agent of the parties responsible for the 
financial assistance programmes: the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the 
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and their successor the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Member States standing behind these funding programmes 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
In a flawed world however, where leaders lack the political will to resolve the sovereign and 
banking crises that threaten the financial systems of the euro area and the rest of the 
globe, the ECB, even though it is not designed for the task, may have a role to play as it is 
the only entity capable of mobilising sufficiently substantial revenue with sufficient speed. It 
is better to have the ECB in its current form take on the quasi-fiscal role of lender-of-last-
resort than to suffer widespread financial ruin. 
In this note I describe the proper role for a well-designed central bank in resolving bank 
and sovereign debt crises: ensuring that markets and financial institutions, including 
sovereigns, remain liquid. I consider how much revenue the ECB can raise without 
threatening its price stability mandate and how it has and could if necessary mobilise this 
revenue in support of financial assistance programmes for illiquid but potentially 
solvent sovereigns. 
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2. THE CENTRAL BANK AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT TO 
GOVERNMENTS 
In a well-designed and properly functioning monetary system an independent and 
unelected monetary policy committee would conduct monetary policy by setting short-term 
interest rates, or perhaps by managing the exchange rate. However, to maintain financial 
stability the less independent and more accountable central bank (distinct from the 
monetary policy committee) must also be willing to take on the quasi-fiscal role of acting 
both as the market maker of last resort and the lender of last resort. 
In a liquidity crisis the markets for a range of financial assets become dysfunctional. 
Trading volume plummets and trading only occur at prices that are far lower than would 
prevail in more orderly times. To restore market functioning, the central bank may have to 
act as the market-maker of last resort by purchasing or accepting as collateral the financial 
assets which either cannot be sold in the market, or can only be sold at fire sale prices, at 
prices below but near to those that would prevail in normal times. If the central bank 
succeeds in reviving the dysfunctional market or markets and if it paid below-market prices 
for the financial assets it purchased then the change in the composition of its balance sheet 
is profitable, its net worth increases and tax payers and society are better off. However, if 
the action is not a success and the assets turn out to be worth significantly less than 
expected, there is a risk that tax payers and society may be worse off.  
Fear-driven markets may believe that a financial institution (or even a class of financial 
institutions or the sovereign itself) is insolvent. Then this financial institution cannot borrow 
or can only borrow at far-above-market interest rates. As a result market participants’ 
expectations are self-fulfilling and the financial institution is indeed insolvent, even though 
it would have been solvent otherwise. In scenarios where more than one outcome is 
possible the central bank can act as the lender of last resort to ensure the socially preferred 
outcome is realized. If there is the potential for a fear-driven run on otherwise solvent 
financial institutions and the central bank is credible that it stands willing to act as lender of 
last resort and to lend as much as it takes to avert the run, the run may never happen. If 
the run does occur and the bank makes a loan to the threatened financial institution the 
fear may pass and the financial institution can return to the market as normal.  
If the loan was made at a penalty rate and the illiquidity was temporary, a solvent borrower 
repays, the central bank makes a profit and tax payers and society are better off. But there 
is a risk that the illiquid borrower turns out to be insolvent as well. Then, the loan is not 
repaid, the central bank’s net worth declines and tax payers and society are worse off.  
To the degree that dysfunctional markets or illiquid financial institutions have systemic 
importance, the fates of other financial markets and institutions are affected by the central 
bank’s intervention. In deciding whether to purchase an illiquid asset outright or accept it 
as collateral or whether or not to rescue an illiquid but possibly solvent financial institution, 
the central bank is making a decision that can affect the prices of all of the assets on its 
balance sheet as well as those assets held by the private sector. If the market or institution 
under consideration for rescue is sufficiently systemically important, the decision to 
intervene may even reduce the riskiness of the central bank’s own balance sheet and that 
of the nation or area over whose markets it presides. 
Well-designed central banks do and should act as market makers and lenders of last resort 
even though it is difficult in practice to ascertain whether or not the illiquidity is temporary 
and as a consequence they must take on risk on behalf of society. In a properly designed 
monetary system, however, the central bank should have far less independence and far 
more formal and substantive accountability than is enjoyed by the ECB.  
PE 475.116 7 
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policies 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
In a properly designed monetary system, the central bank should if necessary make a 
market for sovereign as well as bank debt if this market is dysfunctional and it should stand 
ready to provide liquidity to a solvent but illiquid sovereign as well as to a solvent but 
illiquid bank. Like banks, a sovereign without control over its central bank is prone to 
liquidity and maturity mismatch between its assets and liabilities and can suffer the same 
fear-driven wholesale market funding run.  
The liquidity providing role of the central bank should, however, be distinguished from the 
provision of solvency support to either banks or sovereigns. The ECB has been pressured to 
provide not just liquidity support but also solvency support to both banks and sovereigns in 
the euro area and it is under pressure to do more of this.1  This backdoor socialisation of 
bank debt and sovereign debt, without any proper accountability is extremely damaging to 
the legitimacy of the institutions involved and even to parliamentary democracy.  
                                                 
1  The ECB is not alone; the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke appears to have felt required to take on the 
distasteful task of bailing out the AIG without authorisation from the US Congress. 
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3. SEIGNIORAGE 
In this section I describe how the ability to print fiat money produces revenue for the 
central bank and, ultimately, its government or governments. I provide some estimates of 
the likely revenue that the ECB can generate while still providing price stability. 
The time-t budget constraint of a government can be expressed algebraically as 
 
where Gt is the real value of time-t government spending , Tt is the real value of time-t 
taxes, Mt is the time-t money stock, Bt is the time-t stock of outstanding government debt, 
it is the nominal interest rate between time t-1 and time t and Pt is the time-t price level. 
The above equation says that government spending (the left-hand side of the equation) can 
be financed by levying taxes (the first term on the right-hand side), increasing the money 
supply (the second term on the right-hand side) or by increasing its issuance of 
government debt (the third term on the right-hand side).  
The revenue attained by increasing the money supply is known as seigniorage. If we rule 
out Ponzi games where the government issues ever increasing amounts of debt to pay off 
previous borrowing, the sequence of above (within-period) government budget constraints  
implies the government’s intertemporal budget constraint: the present discounted value of 
current and future government spending equals the present discounted value of current 
and future taxes plus the present discounted value of current and future seigniorage. 
The seigniorage generated by the central bank can be a convenient source of revenue for a 
government as it is easy to collect: administrative costs are low compared to those 
associated with other types of taxation. For governments with inefficient tax systems, 
collecting a significant fraction of revenue in the form of seigniorage can be desirable. 
Throughout history the ability of sovereigns to wage war was dependent on how much 
seigniorage they could extract. In modern economies with efficient tax systems, however, 
seigniorage is seen as an especially distortionary tax and it is typical for central banks to 
have the pursuit of low inflation as their legislated mandate. As a result, seigniorage 
revenue is small relative to total revenue, although it can still be significant. A key question 
for the euro area is how large is the discounted present value of the seigniorage that the 
Eurosystem can extract over time if it pursues its price stability mandate.  
The issuance of fiat money is an extremely profitable monopoly. Proceeding with some 
crude, back-of-the-envelope figures, suppose that in a typical year the real value of the 
euro area monetary base is ten percent of euro area GDP and inflation and the real growth 
of GDP are both two percent. Then the amount of seigniorage collected is about 0.4 percent 
of Euro Area GDP. If Euro Area GDP is very roughly ten trillion euros, then the Eurosystem 
can collect 40 billion euros of seigniorage in a year. Using more refined techniques and 
making conservative assumptions about real GDP growth, Buiter and Rahbari (2011) 
estimate that the Eurosystem can collect seigniorage revenue with a present discounted 
value of about three trillion euros while maintaining inflation of two percent.2  
 
                                                 
2  For the Fed, it is easy to come up with conservative estimates of the net present value of future seigniorage in 
excess of seven trillion dollars. 
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The Eurosytem’s seigniorage, after subtracting the operating costs of this massive – 
perhaps even bloated – body, belong to the tax payers of the euro area.3 The national 
central banks (NCBs) distribute their share of the seigniorage to national treasuries and as 
a consequence of this revenue a flow of national government expenditure can be financed 
with a smaller stream of (non-seigniorage) taxes than would be necessary without 
the seigniorage.  
Unfortunately, central bank profits have already been compromised by events during the 
financial crisis. By taking on credit risk, often at less than ex ante fair rates of 
remuneration, the Eurosystem and other central banks have risked transferring some of the 
present discounted value of their seigniorage to those parties that have succeeded in 
offloading the credit risk on it.4 In a better world a central bank should only take on credit 
risk with the knowledge and agreement of the tax payers who own the seigniorage, or their 
trustees, the elected officials to whom the central bank is ultimately accountable. 
Unfortunately, there was and is no appropriate governmental body to give prior to approval 
to the ECB and there is no proper ex post accountability. Nor is any improvement in ECB 
governance and accountability on the horizon. 
                                                 
3  Even after allowing for its roles other than monetary policy it is not completely clear why the central bank of 
France needed 12,746 employees in 2010. (Central Bank Directory 2012, Franklin Templeton Investments). 
4  Examples of such transfers include the national central bank of Luxembourg’s long-standing policy of allowing 
Icelandic banks to borrow from it using each other’s debt as collateral; the unlimited one-year fixed rate 
liquidity provision of June 2009 which may have been a transfer of about EUR 1 billion from taxpayers to 
happy banks; the Eurosystem’s purchase of Greek sovereign debt at (apparently) way above market value. 
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4. WAYS THAT THE ECB CAN LEND TO ILLIQUID 
SOVEREIGNS 
In this section I consider four methods that the ECB can use to lend to illiquid but 
potentially solvent sovereigns. I also consider the possible use of ECB funds to recapitalise 
banks and to fund deposit insurance schemes. 
4.1 Buying sovereign debt outright in secondary markets 
A straightforward way that the ECB can use its seigniorage to support illiquid but potentially 
solvent sovereigns is to buy their debt outright in secondary markets. This has already 
been done under the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) announced on 10 May 2010. 
On 13 April 2012, euro area periphery sovereign debt worth EUR 214 billion was 
outstanding under the SMP. The ECB does not publish data on the composition of its 
purchases, but it is widely assumed that so far the ECB has purchased Greek, Portuguese, 
Irish, Spanish and Italian government debt securities under the programme. The flow of 
new sovereign debt purchases under the SMP has declined markedly recently and has been 
effectively zero since February 2012. 
There is little doubt that the ECB’s SMP purchases prevented major financial turmoil that 
could have resulted in a chain of defaults of otherwise probably solvent euro area banks 
and sovereigns, notably in May 2010 and again in August 2011 and October and 
November 2011. The SMP is an ineffective method, however, for ensuring that sovereigns 
are able to borrow at reasonable interest rates. It is inefficient to cap the yield of the entire 
outstanding debt stock, which effectively requires offering to purchase all outstanding 
sovereign debt at above-market prices, just to put a lid on the yield of newly issued 
sovereign debt. 
The reason that the SMP is restricted to secondary market purchases is Article 123.1 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union which forbids 
their direct purchase. Purchases on secondary markets are inefficient and perhaps violate 
the spirit of the Treaty, but they are not specifically forbidden by it.  
Along with being inefficient, the SMP method suffers from the problem that it is being used 
to buy the debt of clearly insolvent sovereigns. And, financial support is being offered to 
profligate but possibly solvent sovereigns without the requirement of collateral and without 
any conditionality that would promote solvency. Without any such commitment mechanism, 
the availability of such support has the potential to create incentive problems that might 
convert illiquidity problems into insolvency problems.  
4.2 Indirect purchases of sovereign debt in primary issue markets 
via banks 
A second method for funding illiquid sovereigns is to use the banks as intermediaries so as 
effectively to allow indirect purchases of sovereign debt in primary issue markets. This 
method requires two components. First, the ECB makes long-term loans to banks at 
subsidized interest rates. Second, financial repression in periphery countries ensures that 
the banks use at least some of the money to purchase their sovereign’s debt in the primary 
issue market.  
As discussed in last quarter’s briefing paper, on 8 December 2011 the ECB announced two 
longer-term fixed-rate and full-allotment refinancing operations (LTROs) with a maturity of 
36 months and the option of early repayment after one year. The interest rates were set at 
the average rate of the main refinancing operations over the life of the 
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respective operation. The allotment dates were 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012. 
A total of 523 banks bid for EUR 489.2 billion in the first LTRO, while 800 banks bid for EUR 
529.5 billion in the second. Given that some previous shorter-term LTROs had matured, the 
total increase in liquidity from LTROs after the second operation was EUR 522.6 billion. The 
terms on which this funding is provided are very attractive. Over the three-year life of a 
LTRO, the average cost of funding could be as little as 60 basis points.  
The other half of this second mechanism is financial repression by the periphery authorities, 
which forces periphery banks to purchase, often in the primary markets, more of their own 
sovereign’s debt and at lower yields than they would without pressure by the authorities. 
This is not entirely objectionable to the banks involved: the likely outcome is that their 
sovereign does not default and thanks to the generous terms offered by the ECB, even 
government debt purchased at higher than fair prices in the primary issue markets offers 
an acceptable carry trade. In the unlikely event that their sovereign defaults, these banks 
were already so exposed to the sovereign that they would have defaulted anyway. 
While this second method has some advantages over the SMP, it has three serious 
problems. First, this method too is inefficient in that only some of the money loaned at 
subsidised rates is used for purchasing sovereign debt. Second, the availability of cheap 
loans worsens moral hazard problems associated with banks. Third, this second method for 
assisting fiscally impaired sovereign suffers from the common problem with the SMP that it 
comes with no conditionality: no commitment mechanism promotes fiscally responsible 
actions on the part of sovereigns. 
4.3 Indirect lending to the euro area periphery sovereigns 
through the IMF 
A third method for assisting illiquid but solvent sovereigns that has not yet been employed 
is to use the IMF as an intermediary. This third method has three components. First, the 
NCBs of the Eurosystem make loans to the IMF. Second, the IMF makes loans to the 
sovereigns. The loans carry low interest rates because of the IMF’s preferred creditor 
status. Third, the sovereigns receiving the loans must be subject to IMF/Troika 
programmes, including an IMF Stand-By Arrangement or some similar programme 
involving subsidized lending in return for some combination of fiscal, financial and 
structural reform. This third component makes this method a potentially substantial 
improvement over the other two. 
A problem with the third method is the question of whether it is really permissible. NCBs 
are allowed to lend to the IMF and the IMF is allowed to lend to sovereigns. NCB loans to 
the IMF that are implicitly, but not explicitly, associated with subsequent IMF loans to euro 
area sovereigns are not specifically forbidden by the Treaty. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
some would perceive such a plan as more than just a violation of the spirit of the Treaty 
and one might expect challenges in the European Court of Justice or in one or more of the 
national constitutional courts. 
A second problem with the third method is whether policy makers will be discriminating 
enough to ensure that only potentially solvent sovereigns are offered immediate support. 
Insolvent sovereigns should be forced to restructure their debt so as to restore likely 
solvency in the presence of good fiscal behaviour before for being considered for such 
funding. It is not confidence inspiring that Greece was provided Troika funding despite 
being clearly insolvent and Portugal and Ireland were provided with funding despite likely 
being insolvent. A third problem is the question of how effective the 
conditionality would be.  
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4.4 Indirect lending to the euro area periphery sovereigns 
through the ESM 
A fourth method is similar to the third, but involves indirect loans from NCBs to illiquid 
sovereigns being channeled through the ESM, rather than the IMF. This could be done by 
making the ESM an eligible counterparty of the Eurosystem. The ESM could then borrow 
from the Eurosystem’s liquidity facilities and use the proceeds to make loans to euro area 
sovereigns. These claims on euro area sovereigns then serve as its collateral in its 
borrowing from the Eurosystem. As the ESM has preferred creditor status, it can make 
loans to sovereigns at favourable rates.  
The primary advantage of method four over the similar method three is that the ESM is a 
European institution. It may be easier for it to be more flexible in the terms of its loans to 
euro area sovereigns than it is for the IMF. It also conveys the favourable impression that 
Europe can solve its own problems and avoids the more embarrassing route of having to 
beg emerging market nations – via the IMF – for financial support.  It suffers from the 
same problems of method three: the danger that support will be given to insolvent 
sovereigns before their debt is restructured, that the conditionality may prove ineffective 
and its legality may be questioned. The courts will need to be convinced that the ESM is 
really a credit institution and not a state agency. 
4.5  Other roles for the ECB 
It is at least a proper role for a well-designed central bank to act a lender-of-last-resort to 
illiquid but potentially solvent sovereigns. Only the ECB’s extreme independence and lack of 
accountability make it ill-suited for the job. Recapitalising banks, however, is not a proper 
role for a central bank and it would be a particularly odious job for the ECB to take on. 
Nevertheless, it is nice to have a banking system and in the event of a crisis the ECB might 
be the only entity around capable of recapitalizing systemically important banks in a 
sufficiently timely manner. The ECB has already played some role in providing capital to 
banks in its provision of highly subsidized lending through the two LTROs. This blatantly 
fiscal role would be less unpalatable if the ECB were also to take on more accountability 
and if the euro area governments were to guarantee the resources committed by the ECB. 
In the event of an imminent Greek exit from the euro area one can expect runs on Greek 
banks. Once the precedent of euro area exit has already occurred runs on other periphery 
nation banks become more likely, even if there are no plans for these nations to exit. To 
ensure the socially desirable outcome of no bank runs it is necessary to have a euro area 
(or preferably EU) deposit guarantee scheme that includes compensation for losses due to 
currency revaluation. In the not highly unlikely event that the need for such insurance 
arises before our political leaders put together such a scheme the ECB and its seigniorage 
may be all that stands between us and disaster. It is a case of the ends justifying 
the means.  
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